Groupthink:
An introduction to Janis' theory of concurrence-seeking tendencies in group work.
By Anthony Hempell
anthony AT anthonyhempell.com
March 3, 2004
Introduction
This paper reviews the major aspects of the groupthink model by Irving Janis. The major concepts of the model are reviewed, as well as an overview of some of the studies and writings conducted on groupthink in the past thirty years. The consequences of groupthink are considered in light of its potential to impact decision-making in organizations and information seeking and use.
Irving Janis created the groupthink model to explain why miscalculations and poor decisions are made in groups, often in the highest-ranking positions, which lead to disastrous failures. The term "groupthink" draws directly from George Orwell's novel 1984, and is a play on Orwell's term doublethink (Sunstien, 2003).
Irving Janis was a major figure in 20th century social psychological research, in the such areas as propaganda analysis, group dynamics, and decision-making (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998). Groupthink was an extension of Janis's previous work researching the effects of stress on individual and group decision-making processes (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998). Janis was especially interested in practical applications for his research, and saw groupthink as a theoretical model for analyzing decision-making within groups, to identify when groups are likely to be making poor decisions (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998).
Since its original publication in 1972, the concept of groupthink has been applied to a vast number of areas, including psychology, management, communications, political science and computer science (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998). Aldag and Fuller (1993, cited in Hogg & Hains, 1998) counted more than 700 citations of groupthink in a 3_ year period from January 1989. Although popular, groupthink is also controversial: empirical research using the groupthink model has met with mixed success, and researchers in the field have proposed changes from minor modifications to a complete rejection of groupthink's validity (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998).
a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action (Janis, 1982, p.9).
Specifically, Janis wrote that some groups act to stifle dissent, value consensus before accuracy, do not adequately examine alternatives and consequences of their actions, and in the end produce disastrous decisions or "fiascoes" (Sunstien, 2003). The essence of groupthink is not overt or explicit use of power to enact conformity, but the sum total of many lesser, subtle constraints which conspire to hold critical perspectives in check (Janis, 1982). Janis felt that the real danger in group decision-making were the
instances of mindless conformity and collective misjudgement of serious risks, which are collectively laughed off in a "clubby atmosphere of relaxed conviviality" (Janis, 1982, p.3).
Central to groupthink theory is the behaviour of people in groups, and the understanding that group behaviour differs markedly from individual behaviour. Safety is not always found in numbers: groups have many potential shortcomings; negative behaviour can be amplified in a group setting (Janis, 1982). Another example of this is group polarization, where like-minded people, after a discussion with other like-minded people, have a tendency to take on a more extreme version of their original position (Brown, 1985, cited by Sunstein, 2003). An extreme example is the creation of an extremist political or religious group, which involves separating members from the rest of society; other examples could include some juries and terrorist groups (Sunstein, 2003).
The groupthink model builds on the work of many social psychologists, in particular Kurt Lewin and Leon Festinger (group cohesiveness), and Wilfred Bion (detrimental effects of cohesiveness) (Janis, 1982). Janis relies on a number of case studies, mostly from foreign policy and international affairs including the Vietnam War, the Bay of Pigs invasion, Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler, Pearl Harbour, and Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union (Sunstien, 2003). When researching these case studies, Janis used archival methods that relied on retrospective accounts and content analysis (Hogg & Hains, 1998).
When explaining the groupthink syndrome, Janis refers to three major types of symptoms of groupthink:
Type I are overestimations of the group's power and morality; including the illusion of invulnerability. This leads to the group members becoming overly optimistic and allows them to consider taking extremely risky actions.
Type II is close-mindedness; includes rationalizations in order to continue on their current path or policy direction (ie, not having to re-assess past decisions); stereotyping outsiders, competitors or enemies as either "too evil to warrant genuine attempts to negotiate, or as too weak and stupid to counter whatever risky attempts are made to defeat their purposes" (Janis, 1982, p. 174)
Type III are pressures towards uniformity; includes self-censorship of opinions that deviate from the group consensus; an illusion of unanimity within the group; pressure on any member who challenges or disagrees with any of the group norms, in the context of such behaviour being contrary to group loyalty; and the "emergence of self-appointed mindguards members who protect the group from adverse information that might shatter their shared complacency about the effectiveness and morality of their decisions." (Janis, 1982, p.175)
Type III are pressures towards uniformity; includes self-censorship of opinions that deviate from the group consensus; an illusion of unanimity within the group; pressure on any member who challenges or disagrees with any of the group norms, in the context of such behaviour being contrary to group loyalty; and the "emergence of self-appointed mindguards members who protect the group from adverse information that might shatter their shared complacency about the effectiveness and morality of their decisions." (Janis, 1982, p.175)
The consequences of these symptoms are that group members are more likely to "perform their collective tasks ineffectively and are likely to fail to attain their collective objectives" (Janis, 1982, p. 175). When a group displays the symptoms of groupthink, it is also likely that they will display symptoms of "defective decision-making", which include:
Failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives
Poor information search
Selective bias in processing information at hand
Failure to work out contingency plans (Janis, 1982)
Janis also describes a number of observable conditions that are common to most cases of groupthink, that happen before decisions are made. These are called the antecedent conditions (or observable causes) of groupthink, and include:
insulation of the group: the group does not have access to experts or critical evaluations in their organization or outside of it;
lack of tradition of impartial leadership: the group's leader has a tendency to use power or prestige to unduly influence the group instead of encouraging debate;
lack of tradition of impartial leadership: the group's leader has a tendency to use power or prestige to unduly influence the group instead of encouraging debate;
a lack of norms for methodical decision-making procedures (Janis, 1982).
These three conditions all involve a "lack of constraints on collective uncritical thinking" (Janis, 1982, p.177). Janis believes that these three conditions can be observed before a group makes decisions, and when combined with a high level of cohesiveness, the group is at risk of experiencing groupthink syndrome. Janis proposed that to counteract or avoid groupthink, a vigilant system of information processing and decision-making should be implemented. The onus is on leaders to recognize the potential for groupthink and to take action, by encouraging actions such as critical discussion, assigning group members the role of a devil's advocate, and bringing in outside experts (Janis, 1982).
Critical assessments of groupthink
In the thirty years since Janis first proposed the groupthink model, there is still little agreement as to the validity of the model in assessing decision-making behaviour (Park, 2000). Janis' theory is often criticized because it does not present a framework that is suitable for empirical testing; instead, the evidence for groupthink comes from largely qualitative, historical or archival methods (Sunstein, 2003). Some critics go so far as to say that Janis's work relies on "anecdote, casual observation, and intuitive appeal rather than rigorous research" (Esser, 1998, cited in Sunstein, 2003, p.142). While some studies have shown support for the groupthink model, the support tends to be mixed or conditional (Esser, 1998); some studies have revealed that a closed leadership style and external threats (in particular, time pressure) promote groupthink and defective decision making (Neck & Moorhead, 1995, cited by Choi & Kim, 1999); the effect of group cohesiveness is still inconclusive (Mullen, Anthony, Salas & Driskel, 1994, cited by Choi & Kim, 1999).
Janis's model tends to be supported by studies that employ a qualitative case-study approach as opposed to experimental research, which tends to either partially support or not support Janis's thesis (Park, 2000). The lack of success in experimental validation of groupthink may be due to difficulties in operationalizing and conceptualizing it as a testable variable (Hogg & Hains, 1998; Park, 2000).
Some researchers have criticized Janis for categorically denouncing groupthink as a negative phenomenon (Longley & Pruitt, 1980, cited in Choi & Kim, 1999). Sniezek (1992) argues that there are instances where concurrence-seeking may promote group performance. When used to explain behaviour in a practical setting, groupthink has been frames as a detrimental group process; the result of this has been that many corporate training programs have created strategies for avoiding groupthink in the workplace (Quinn, Faerman, Thompson & McGrath, 1990, cited in Choi & Kim, 1999).
Another criticism of groupthink is that Janis overestimates the link between the decision-making process and the outcome (McCauley, 1989; Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang & Feld, 1992; cited in Choi & Kim, 1999). Tetlock et al argue that there are many other factors between the decision process and the outcome. The outcome of any decision-making process, they argue, will only have a certain probability of success due to various environmental factors (such as luck).
A large-scale study researching decision-making in seven major American corporations concluded that decision-making worked best when following a sound information processing method; however these groups also showed signs of groupthink, in that they had strong leadership which attempted to persuade others in the group that they were right (Peterson et al, 1998, cited in Sunstein, 2003).
Esser (1998) found that groupthink characteristics were correlated with failures; however cohesiveness did not appear to be a factor: groups consisting of strangers, friends, or various levels of previous experience together did not appear to effect decision-making ability. Janis' claims of insulation of groups and groups led by autocratic leaders did show that these attributes were indicative of groupthink symptoms.
Moorhead & Montanari conducted a study where they concluded that groupthink symptoms had no significant effect on group performance, and that "the relationship between groupthink-induced decision defects and outcomes were not as strong as Janis suggests" (Moorhead & Montanari, 1986, p. 399; cited by Choi & Kim, 1999).
Overall, the groupthink hypothesis appears to be valuable as a descriptive, analytic and heuristic tool (Esser, 1998) but is not a good model for empirical testing; it attempts to explain a complex phenomenon but is difficult to operationalize into testable variables. While some areas of Janis' theory have been supported by empirical or experimental, others remain ambiguous or even contradictory (Sunstein, 2003). When reading the assessments of others, it begs the question of whether groupthink is suited to being used as a model for empirical analysis: is it fair to measure groupthink theory on the basis of laboratory tests, when in real life groupthink occurs within a complex and volatile environment? Janis's original method was one of inductive reasoning from archival records and case studies; perhaps it is better left as a qualitative model that can help illuminate the inexact spheres of organizational behaviour and communications theory.
Groupthink and improving the effectiveness of decision making in organizations
All organizations rely on decision making; an organization is really just a network of decisions (Choo, 1998). How then can organizations ensure that they do not suffer from groupthink, when cohesiveness among group members is generally regarded as a goal instead of something to avoid? Janis (1982) outlines a number of methods that can be used by administrators to counteract tendencies towards groupthink:
The first suggestions encompass how group leaders could approach decision making with an attitude of fostering an environment of dialogue and healthy dissent. Primarily, leaders or administrators should strive for impartiality; their personal biases should be sublimated so as not to unduly influence the group decision-making process. In addition, the group leader should encourage group members to regard critical thinking, objections and misgivings as important topics for discussion, and not trivialize or dismiss them (Janis, 1982).
Another group of suggestions involves changing the structure of the group, so that group dynamics and relationships are kept from being too static and comfortable. If possible, Janis suggests the creation of separate groups under independent leadership to work on the same problem, creating a multiplicity of solutions; in addition (or alternatively), the group could split into subgroups and then re-convene, and sort out their differences. These methods are designed so that familiar patterns of communication and concurrence-seeking are disrupted, forcing group members to do more independent thinking.
One of the antecedents of groupthink can be isolation or a lack of information; therefore bringing in voices and opinions from outside the group could alleviate this situation. One solution is for group members to periodically discuss their deliberations with trusted colleagues, and report back with their feedback. Another is to bring in qualified experts or colleagues from outside of the group to be included as guest speakers or participants in order to challenge commonly held views or assumptions (Janis, 1982).
Lastly, the group leader should make sure that contrary opinions and dissenting voices are integrated into the decision-making process. At least one group member should always have the role as a devil's advocate, to champion unpopular or contrary opinions. After reaching a decision, the group should also have the opportunity to have a "second chance" meeting, where group members are free to express any residual doubts or concerns about their choice (Janis, 1982).
By using these ideas to foster a climate of openness and willingness to engage in debate, an administrator can act to counteract potential group tendencies towards unanimity or conformity.
Groupthink and information seeking and use
The role of the information professional in alleviating groupthink can also be founded in Janis's suggestions for organizational leaders. However, information professionals may not always be in a primary position of orchestrating or exerting influence over the decision-making process. At this point, it becomes necessary for those involved in the decision-making process to also be aware of groupthink tendencies, and to strive to counteract them. For example, a librarian who has been asked to gather certain materials for a meeting or client may make a conscious decision to include a variety of sources, some which may contain contrary or radical positions to what is normally expected.
Information professionals must also not be overly concerned with achieving consensus or simply satisficing decision-making goals. When decisions are made too easily in a group in which they are consulting, it is their duty to attempt to "stir the pot" and act as the devil's advocate or even research alternate opinions or try and contact an outside expert. Being aware of the antecedents to groupthink, and taking a pro-active stance that encourages discussion and discourages complicity is a necessary role for the information professional.
Conclusion
For over thirty years Irving Janis' model of groupthink has proven resilient enough to continue to explain some of the mystifying characteristics of group decision-making behaviour. While controversial to some and dismissed by others, groupthink still retains value as a paradigm for thinking about some how organizations think. As Esser (1998) suggests, the major contribution of groupthink theory has been its value as a heuristic, and by stimulating discussion about group decision-making.
While it still remains a useful theoretical concept, caution should be exercised when attributing predictions or consequences of actions to groupthink. Janis's inductive method, starting with fiascoes and then analyzing the situations that led up to them, is not necessarily a reliable method for creating a testable hypothesis. I tend to agree with Tetlock et al (1992; cited in Choi & Kim, 1999) who questioned whether groupthink was the definitive factor in the creation of fiascoes -- there are more factors than group cohesiveness and decision-making that can contribute to a disastrous outcome. Making the decision is one matter; implementing it is entirely another.
Being cognizant of groupthink as both a theoretical model and a potential professional pitfall appears important; however as an information professional one must always be keeping one's eyes open for alternative explanations, and be vigilant against any concurrence-seeking tendency.
Bibliography
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